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SKIRTING SUPREMACY AND SUBORDINATION: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE UK SUPREME COURT 
 
ROGER MASTERMAN

 AND JO ERIC KHUSHAL MURKENS
*
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the revolutionary quality of French 
and American constitutionalism caused radical, liberal, and anti-reformers to reflect 
on the idea of the British constitution. Thomas Paine jettisoned the venerated British 
constitution and replaced it with imported French and American concepts of universal 
principle and natural rights. The new political vocabulary appealed to the present 
rather than to history and to traditional liberties. ‘The American constitutions were to 
liberty, what grammar is to language; they define its parts of speech, and practically 
construct them into syntax’.1 The French and American Constitutions became the 
paradigm for scrupulously separating the organs of state, distinguishing between 
constituent and constituted power, and guaranteeing legally-enshrined and (later) 
judicially-protected individual rights against the state by means of constitutional 
documents that, as higher order law, took precedence over ordinary laws in the case of 
conflict. 
Opponents of reform viewed Montesquieu’s argument that strict separation 
between the three organs of government in relation to both functions and personnel 
was a necessary condition for the protection of political liberty and the prevention of 
arbitrary power as Continental hubris. The UK’s own idea of ‘mixed government’, i.e. 
the joint participation of the three estates (united as Monarch, Lords and Commons) in 
the functions of government and with interlocking (rather than hierarchical) political 
institutions (with mutual checks and combined interpretations), was considered to be 
superior to the French and American paradigm. For George Canning, co-founder of 
the Anti-Jacobin newspaper, it was not Britain’s island status that had saved it from 
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Napoleon, but ‘some secret virtue in her constitution, under its present practice’.2 
Britain owed its political stability, economic wealth, and military successes to ‘the 
freedom of our government and the blessings of our constitution’, which was the 
‘envy and admiration of the world’.3 
If one had to pick a secret virtue of the eighteenth century constitution, one 
could do worse than to choose mixed government. It had already been fully defined 
by Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England (1765-9), Jean de 
Lolme’s Constitution of England (1775), and William Paley’s Principles of Moral 
and Political Philosophy (1785). A quasi-independent judiciary upheld the laws of the 
land, and Parliament checked the ambitions of the Government. In short, the ideal of 
mixed government pursued a very similar objective to the doctrine of separation of 
powers, except by other means: it prevented one of the three estates from imposing its 
will upon another through an exercise of reciprocal checks and balances.
4
 The British 
constitution thus produced its own brand of less visible separation of powers that was 
not the result of any conscious exercise in constitutional design, but of ‘political 
experience, the logic or accident of events.’5  
While the façade of mixed government has remained largely intact until today, 
its inner workings have undergone radical change.  The traditional subordination of 
the Courts to, and by, the ‘political constitution’6 has since the middle of the twentieth 
century gradually yielded, permitting initially procedural but increasingly intrusive 
judicial review of administrative and executive decisions.  More recently, this 
jurisdiction has been bolstered through the statutory allocation of explicit powers, and 
the arrogation of implicit powers, of quasi-constitutional review. These internal 
revisions of the mixed government model have culminated in significant and visible 
structural reform: the (physical) severing of links between Parliament and judiciary 
                                                 
2
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with the establishment of an independent United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) 
under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  
The previous subordinate role of the judicial House of Lords arguably 
followed naturally from its presence in the Palace of Westminster.  The abolition of 
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, therefore, raises a series of questions 
relating to the nature of the UKSC’s relationship with Parliament and the 
constitutional authority of the United Kingdom’s apex court.  In this article we assess 
the cumulative effects of the gradual expansion of the constitutional competences of 
the UK’s apex court and the rather more sudden formalisation of the doctrine of 
judicial independence through the structural independence of the UKSC.  We argue 
that while the UKSC eschews many of the jurisdictional and structural precedents set 
by other constitutional or apex courts, its core tasks are integral to the constitutional 
function of subjecting both legislature and executive to the legal control.  Though 
apparently running counter to orthodox accounts of the judicial role in the constitution 
we argue that the authority of the UKSC to review cases, conduct, and the constitution 
stems, not only from explicit statutory direction but, from its counter-majoritarian 
function that derives from the domestic constitutional principle of the rule of law. Any 
parallels with apex courts, constitutional councils, or councils of state on the 
European continent are not willed by us, but nor are they entirely accidental: where 
the mixed government model historically avoided the Continental, revolutionary and 
modern ideal of visible separation of powers, the contemporary UK constitution has 
incrementally and almost surreptitiously adopted some of its characteristics.  
 
‘HANDMAIDS TO PARLIAMENT’S WILL’: THE TRADITIONAL SUBORDINATION OF THE 
COURT 
Adam Tomkins claimed in 2003 (before the establishment of the UKSC) that ‘the 
separation of power English-style’ continued to be ‘a confrontational, bi-partisan, bi-
polar separation, between the only two powers the constitution has ever recognised as 
enjoying any degree of sovereignty, namely the Crown and Parliament’.7 It is true that 
the courts did not historically play a leading role in the interpretation of constitutional 
law and politics. Their role was restricted to identifying Parliamentary sovereignty as 
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a political fact. The chapters of Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution, first 
published in 1867, deal with the Cabinet, the Monarchy, the House of Lords, the 
House of Commons, changes of ministry, checks and balances, and cabinet 
government; Bagehot has next to nothing to say about law or law courts. Similarly, 
A.V. Dicey’s late-nineteenth century image of Parliament as the sole and final legal 
authority does not include the courts.
8
 By the mid-twentieth century, however, Ivor 
Jennings defined legal sovereignty as 
 
a form of expression which lawyers use to express the relations between 
Parliament and the courts. It means that the courts will always recognise 
as law the rules which Parliament makes by legislation.
9
 
 
Here Jennings at least recognises the role of the courts, albeit as ‘modest 
underworkers’ and ‘handmaids to Parliament’s will’.10 Their duty was to interpret the 
text and to declare the law,
11
 and they enjoyed only limited review powers over 
delegated authority by Parliament to subordinate bodies.
12
  
The eighteenth-century Blackstonean creed, that statutes had to be obeyed and 
applied, however unreasonable,
13
 remained unchallenged until the first half of the 
twentieth century following two major political developments: first, the 
democratisation of the House of Commons (general franchise); second, the 
downgrading of the Parliamentary House of Lords with the loss of the suspensory 
veto in relation to public Bills introduced in the House of Commons (Parliament Act 
1911). As the UK moved from oligarchy to democracy, the Reform Acts of 1832, 
1867 and 1884 (women were enfranchised in 1918 and 1928) opened up political 
participation, and as the volume of legislation began to increase, it became 
                                                 
8
 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, [1885] 10th ed., (London: 
Macmillan, 1959). 
9
 I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of London Press, 1959), 
p.149.  
10
 R. Cotterrell, ‘Judicial Review and Legal Theory’, in G. Richardson & H. Genn (eds), Administrative 
Law and Government Action, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.17, 25.  
11
 Duport Steels Ltd v. Sirs [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142, 157 (Lord Diplock). 
12
 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, 230 (Lord 
Greene M.R.) 
13
 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), p.156.  
  
5 
 
increasingly inappropriate for the judiciary to intrude into the public law arena. 
Judges found they had to interpret statutes, many of them directed to empowering 
public authorities to provide services or to regulate and control private activities. By 
adopting a plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation
14
 (to avoid any charge 
of substituting its view of the law for that expressed by Parliament in legislation) the 
judiciary acknowledged that democracy and public policy (i.e. most of effective law-
making) were generally regarded as political matters to be determined in and by 
Parliament not by the judges.
15
  
The impact of this recognition on the constitutional status of the courts was 
enormous. Between 1842 and the UK’s accession to the European Community in 
January 1973, not a single case (!) reached the House of Lords on the question of the 
absence of limitations of Parliament’s ultimate law-making authority.16 The period 
from World War II until the 1960s ‘marked the depths of the irrelevance of the courts 
in the development of the constitution,’17 driving Lord Devlin to conclude that: 
 
The common law has now, I think, no longer the strength to provide any 
satisfactory solution to the problem of keeping the executive, with all the 
powers which under modern conditions are needed for the efficient conduct of 
the realm, under proper control. The responsibility for that now rests with 
Parliament.
18
  
 
While the Warren Court in the USA
19
 and the Federal Constitutional Court in 
Germany
20
 were handing down landmark constitutional decisions that expanded civil 
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rights and liberties as well as judicial power, the UK judiciary essentially 
acknowledged, and contributed to, the failure of one key aspect of liberal 
constitutionalism: legal accountability of government in the courts. Moreover, in the 
absence of a codified constitution guaranteeing its status, and with nothing equivalent 
to the powers assumed by the Supreme Court in the United States, ‘the role of the 
judiciary under the constitution [remained] a matter of inference rather than express 
provision’.21  
The historic subordination of the courts, however, cannot be solely be 
explained by the absence of a constitutional text or strict adherence to the separation 
of powers.  The non-existence of effective principles of constitutionality that would 
permit legal control of the democratic law-making process is a logical consequence of 
Parliament’s unlimited and unrivalled legislative power. 22 Parliamentary sovereignty 
forces the judiciary into subservience which it justifies with reference to democratic 
legitimacy, which in turn results in a tendency towards formalist approaches to 
statutory construction and the existence of a strong judicial culture of deference to the 
legislature most clearly evidenced in the virtual immunity of statute from judicial 
challenge.
23
   
One of the defining characteristics of the political constitution is that it 
permitted little, if any, scope for the courts to seek to bring a set of external, higher 
order, moral and political values to bear on the resolution of the legal disputes that the 
political process generated: the common law and its precedents, along with powers 
allocated by statute, had to suffice. However, it is also typical of the political 
constitution that the duty of the courts to apply statutes would be habitual, and thus 
liable to change, rather than legal. Whether the will of Parliament would be obeyed 
even in the case of pernicious legislation is a matter of dispute to which we will return 
later.  
 
                                                 
21
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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The problem with Tomkins’ view is that it does not draw attention to the 
constitutional significance of two statutes. First, the Act of Settlement 1701 granted 
the senior judiciary formal independence from the government, further underlining 
their constitutional importance. The historian of the British judiciary, Robert Stevens, 
dates ‘the role of the judges as an independent force within the British Constitution’ to 
the Act of Settlement 1701. Her Majesty’s judges now held office quamdiu se bene 
gesserint,
24
 rather than at Her Majesty’s pleasure.  
Second, the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 established a new Court of 
Appeal which, together with the High Court, became the Supreme Court of England 
and Wales (renamed the Senior Courts of England and Wales by the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 to avoid confusion with the new Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom).
25
 The 1876 Act provided for the appointment of paid, full-time, 
professional judges (Lords of Appeal in Ordinary or, colloquially, Law Lords). 
Although the judiciary continued to acknowledge the superiority of Parliament and 
statute over the courts and common law, it nonetheless gained through reform a 
degree of insulation against both legislative and executive interference in its judicial 
role. 
Admittedly, the independence and modernisation and professionalisation of 
the judiciary still failed to make the separation of powers visible. The 1876 Act still 
required the Law Lords to exercise judicial authority and sit in the legislature. Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury said that since ‘practically they have often to make law as 
judges, they will do it all the better from having to make it as legislators’.26 However, 
these developments nonetheless mark the beginnings of an increasingly visible 
separation and serve to highlight that the changing relationship between the apex 
court and Parliament has been conditioned by both the strengthening of the ideal of 
judicial independence and by the incremental development of the powers of the 
judicial branch.  
                                                 
24
 See Stevens, The English Judges, above n.00, pp.9, 10-13. 
25
 See D. Steele, ‘The Judicial House of Lords: Abolition and Restoration 1873-6’. in L. Blom-Cooper 
et al, The Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
26
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This nineteenth-century fusion of governmental power was the express target 
of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), which curtailed the powers of the Lord 
Chancellor
27
 and replaced the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords with a new 
United Kingdom Supreme Court as the ‘apex court’ for the whole United Kingdom on 
1
st
 October 2009. The UKSC assumed the existing jurisdiction of the House of Lords, 
as well as the devolution jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
 
becoming the final court of appeal in the United Kingdom in respect of civil and 
criminal matters originating in England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, and in 
respect of civil matters only originating in Scotland.  
The principal concern of the CRA was to provide continuity (judicial 
independence
28
) as well as to instigate change (removal of the judicial House of Lords 
from the Palace of Westminster). The constitutional impetus for the latter had come 
from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which had assessed 
the independence and impartiality of tribunals under Article 6 ECHR ‘from an 
objective viewpoint’. 29  The intention behind the UK government’s response was, 
therefore, to enhance judicial independence physically and visibly by removing the 
judicial function from the House of Lords,
30
 but also financially and 
administratively.
31
 Introducing the bill, Lord Falconer said that ‘…the key objective 
[was] to achieve a full and transparent separation between the judiciary and the 
legislature’32 – a sentiment echoed by the UKSC’s first president, Lord Phillips of 
Worth Matravers, on the day the Court opened for business:  
 
For the first time, we have a clear separation of powers between the legislature, 
the judiciary and the executive in the United Kingdom. This is important. It 
                                                 
27
 See: D. Woodhouse, The Office of Lord Chancellor (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) and now Part 2, 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
28
 Sections 3 and 4 CRA 2005. For a counter thesis see M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and 
Political Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p.66 and Chapter 2.  
29
 Findlay v. United Kingdom, (1997) 24 EHRR 221, at [73]; McGonnell v. United Kingdom (2000) 30 
EHRR 289. 
30
 HL Debs, Vol.657, Col.92, 9 February 2004.  On the Law Lords’ participation in the legislative and 
debating work of the House of Lords see: Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘Voices from the Past – the Law 
Lords’ Contribution to the Legislative Process’ (2007) 123 L.Q.R. 547. 
31
 HL Debs, Vol.657, Col.928, 9 February 2004 (Lord Falconer). 
32
 HL Debs, Vol.657, Col.1131, 9 February 2004.   
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emphasises the independence of the judiciary, clearly separating those who 
make the law from those who administer it.
33
 
 
The CRA enhances (rather than create ex nihilo) judicial independence through 
visible separation. Complete institutional separation of the three branches of 
government remains the antithesis of the idea of mixed government. Yet the 
establishment of the UKSC – and the associated reforms implemented under the CRA 
– brings about and clarifies the status of the judiciary as a separate and distinct branch 
of government.
34
  Yet obstacles remain.  Judicial independence is, for instance, still 
not constitutionally guaranteed: the tenth edition of Wade and Forsyth’s classic 
textbook Administrative Law (published in 2009) still contains the caution that ‘if [the 
courts] fly too high, Parliament may clip their wings’. 35   Though portrayed as a 
cosmetic alteration to the constitutional architecture, the symbolic detachment of the 
judiciary from both executive and legislature has added an institutional dynamic to the 
principle of judicial independence that was previously lacking.  Before considering 
the powers through which this influence might be realised, it is worth pausing to ask 
what would appear to be a more straightforward question: what type of court is the 
UKSC?  
 
WHAT KIND OF COURT IS THE UKSC? 
The literature suggests a number of labels for apex courts, none of which fit exactly 
the current self-understanding, competences, or likely future trajectory of the UKSC.  
 
1. A constitutional organ 
i. A ‘specialist organ’ or ‘constitutional court’;36 
                                                 
33
 Press Notice 01/09, ‘Supreme Court of the United Kingdom comes into existence’, 01 October 2009. 
34
 R. Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution: Judicial Competence 
and Independence in the United Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Chapter 8; 
V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), Chapter 11.   
35
 H.W.R. Wade & C. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 10th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
p.26.  See also: I. Jennings, The Queen’s Government (London: Penguin Books, 1961), p.145.    
36
 Inspired by projects of constitutional review in the nineteenth-century constitutions of Norway, 
Denmark, and Greece, the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen in 1920 drafted a new constitution for Austria 
that established the world's first separate constitutional court. 
  
10 
 
ii. A constitutional council;37 
2. A legitimating organ 
iii. the ‘ultimate legal guardian of the constitution’;38 
iv. a ‘proto-constitutional’ court (that ensures constitutionality and legality, 
e.g. in relation to the war against terrorism);
39
 
v. an agent of ‘external standards of justice’40 or ‘the enduring values of our 
society’41 (such as rights, liberties, restraints, and obligations which are 
fundamental to a democracy); 
vi. an ‘agent of the people’;42 
vii. a ‘counter-majoritarian institution’;43   
3. A judicial organ 
viii. A general or ordinary court of appeal/legal institution;44 
ix. a federal court;45 
                                                 
37
 The de Gaulle Constitution of France (1958) created the conseil constitutionnel with the power to 
declare parliamentary bills unconstitutional (i.e. prior to enactment). But it is a council, not a court of 
law, and it does not form part of the judicial system. Litigants have no access to it directly or indirectly 
via appeals from lower courts: see: J. Bell, ‘What Is the Function of the Conseil d'État in the 
Preparation of Legislation?’ (2000) 49(3) I.C.L.Q. 661. 
38
 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom (The Constitution Unit, 
UCL, 2002), p.7. 
39
 On ‘proto-constitutional court’ see T. Dalyell, House of Commons debates, 12 May 1998, col. 209; 
R. Hazell, R. Masterman, et al, ‘The Constitution: Coming in from the Cold’ (2002) 55(2) 
Parliamentary Affairs, 219-234, 233; in relation to terrorism see A. Barak, ‘A Judge on Judging: The 
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy’ (2002-3) 116 Harvard Law Journal 19, esp. 158-160.  
40
 D. Adamany, ‘Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court’ (1973) Wisconsin Law 
Review 790, 794-795. 
41
 A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: the Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, (Indianapolis : 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), p.26. 
42
 See e.g. Article 25(4) of the German Federal Constitutional Court Act: ‘The decisions shall be 
issued “in the name of the people”’. See also Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service 
Association 53 R. I. 122, at 138, 179 Atl. 139, at 146 (1935). 
43
 A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: the Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), pp.16-23. 
44
 Section 40 Constitutional Reform Act 2005; P.E. Quint, ‘Most Extraordinarily Powerful Court of 
Law the World Has Ever Known – Judicial Review in the United States and Germany’ (2006) 65 
Maryland Law Review 152. 
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x. an ‘agent of Parliament’ (that hands down neutral and impartial 
judgements that are respectful of precedent and based on the will of 
Parliament as expressed in statute);
46
  
xi. a ‘supervisory’ court;47 
4. A political organ 
xii. a national policy-maker/political institution?48  
xiii. An agent of constitutional change.49 
 
At the outset, two types can be ruled out: the UKSC is neither a clearly political 
institution,
50
 nor was it ever destined to enjoy a general power to invalidate legislation 
akin to that exercised by the Supreme Court in the United States, and the 
Constitutional Courts in South Africa and Germany.
51
 In many ways the sudden 
creation of a new institution is an un-British occurrence, and the UKSC itself is an un-
British court: it does not have an original name, and it was designed to deal with an 
alien problem that arose out of a particular reading of the European Convention of 
Human Rights.
52
 
                                                                                                                                            
45
 In relation to the ‘quasi-federal’ character of the UK, see V. Bogdanor, Devolution in the United 
Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.291; M. Laffin and A. Thomas, ‘The United 
Kingdom: Federalism in Denial?’ (1999) 29(3) Publius 89-107.  
46
 In principal-agent models, authoritative acts of delegation are linked (as in a chain) from one 
constitutionally recognised authority to another. Judges possess broad decision-making powers within 
the constitutional framework. But does it make the UKSC – in the terminology of delegation theory –
an agent? See R.A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), pp.286-287; A. Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary 
Democracy’ (2002) 25(1) West European Politics 77–100, 81. 
47
 D. Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.89.  
48
 R.A. Dahl, ‘Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker’, 
(1957) 6 Journal of Public Law 279.  
49
 R. G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); 
see also M.A. Graber, ‘The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary’ (1993) 
7 Studies in American Political Development 35-73.  
50
 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade [1977] 2 W.L.R. 235, 267 (Lawton L.J.). 
51
 Department of Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United 
Kingdom (CP 11/03), July 2003, at [23].   
52
 See McGonnell v UK above n .00.  
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Although the CRA 2005 did not instigate radical constitutional change, the 
transition from House of Lords to UKSC has nonetheless had two significant effects. 
The first adjustment is superficial: the traditional division of labour between court and 
legislature has been enhanced and made increasingly visible, but neither the UKSC’s 
jurisdiction nor its initial composition departed radically from those of the House of 
Lords. In this respect, the UKSC’s creation is in line with ‘the evolutionary nature of 
the common law and the institutional pragmatism of the constitution’.53  
The second outcome relates to the increased institutional independence of the 
UKSC.  To be sure, the UKSC does not have suprema potestas, but neither is it ‘a 
third chamber in perpetual session’. Instead, we argue that it has been emancipated 
from subservience and matured into a court with its own independent and autonomous 
constitutional status. The creation of the UKSC comes at the tail-end of a steady 
expansion of judicial power and a broader recalibration of the historic imbalance 
between the constitutional influence of the judiciary, executive and Parliament that 
began in the 1960s in judicial review cases. In the 1980s the courts began to review 
cases of administrative action based not on the authorisation of Parliament, but on 
common law standards.
54
 The effects of this transition, which accelerated during the 
1990s, have been described as ‘one of the most fundamental realignments of the 
constitutional order since the end of the seventeenth century’.55  Over this period – as 
a cumulative result of the explicit (statutory) conferral and implicit arrogation of 
judicial powers – the apex court gradually developed a ‘pronounced public law 
profile’56 such that the UKSC can now be seen to discharge ‘some of the functions of 
a constitutional court’.57  
Yet the absence of explicit authorisation to act as a ‘counter-majoritarian’ 
force, as ‘guardian of the constitution’, or as an ‘agent of constitutional change’ 
acknowledges two paradoxes. First, while a culture of legal controls and judicial 
                                                 
53
 C.J.S. Knight, ‘Striking Down Legislation Under Bi-polar Sovereignty’, [2011] P.L. 90, 91. 
54
 J. Jowell, & A. Lester, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law’ [1987] 
P.L. 368. 
55
 A. Tomkins, Public Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p.23.  
56
 T. Poole and S. Shah, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords’ [2009] P.L. 347, 
361.  See also: The Supreme Court Annual Report and Accounts 2010-2011 (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2011), HC 976, p.6.   
57
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review of the constitution has historically been absent, the UKSC – as a result of both 
the expanded role for the court as a constraint on government and the enhanced 
legitimacy which attaches to its institutional independence – enjoys greater 
constitutional influence than its predecessor; Lord Hope has spoken of the ‘added 
authority’ carried by decisions handed down by a Supreme Court independent of the 
legislature,
58
 while it has been suggested in Parliament that the UKSC is ‘increasingly 
robust’.59  Second, whereas the judges have claimed and received more power in their 
relations with government and Parliament, deference to the elected branches remains 
a recurrent – though contested – characteristic of public law litigation.60   
As Robert Stevens has observed, ‘[t]he cult of parliamentary sovereignty 
hangs so heavily in the air that the reality of recent transfers of powers to the judges is 
shrouded in its mythology.’61  Instead of perpetuating that mythology by airbrushing 
the courts out of the constitutional picture (cf. Dicey, Jennings, Tomkins), we argue 
on the grounds of both the power and status it has acquired that the UKSC be 
recognised in most (legal) cases as an ‘ordinary court’ of final appeal, and in 
exceptional (constitutional) cases as a ‘liminal’ or threshold court equipped with 
‘residual powers’62 that operates at the intersection of law and politics.63 Authority for 
                                                 
58
 Lord Hope, Barnard’s Inn Reading, ‘The Creation of the Supreme Court – Was it worth it?’, 24 June 
2010. 
59
 HC Debs, Vol.523, Col.968, 16
 
February 2011 (Mark Pritchard MP).  
60
 For instance: R v. Director of Public Prosecution, Ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, at 380-1 (Lord 
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deference”’ in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland, Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003); T. R. S. Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of “due deference” 
[2006] C.L.J. 671. 
61
 Stevens, above n.00, p.143.   
62
 See S. Wheatle, ‘The Residual Powers of the Court’, UK Constitutional Law Group blog, 10 July 
2012.  The concept of a ‘liminal’ or threshold court is our own coinage.  
63
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every decision is political. But ‘political questions’ (i.e. foreign affairs, fiscal policy, and national 
security) have tended to be non-justiciable in UK courts (see e.g. R (Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament) v. Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin)). Generally, ‘the more purely 
political…a question is, the more appropriate it will be for political resolution….Conversely, the 
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this proposition stems from the rule of law which conceives and legitimates the 
constitutional role of the UKSC as a counter-majoritarian institution to the consent-
giving processes of Parliament.  
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCES OF THE UKSC 
The autonomous, and authoritative, interpretative function of the UKSC underpins its 
burgeoning constitutional jurisdiction and adds weight to the suggestion that the 
UKSC be regarded as co-equal to Parliament in the resolution of constitutional 
disputes. The following section will discuss the specific constitutional functions the 
UKSC has acquired in relation to EU law, individual rights, and devolution. In these 
areas the UKSC fulfils a number of the functions commonly associated with apex 
courts which have marked the court out as a constitutional actor in its own right.   
 
Explicit Powers of Quasi-Constitutional Review 
The UKSC has ‘explicit’ powers of quasi-constitutional review in relation to matters 
arising under the European Communities Act 1972, the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
the United Kingdom’s devolution legislation.64.  In these areas, the UKSC operates as 
a proto-constitutional court and – in the exercise of the devolution jurisdiction – as a 
functional federal court, adjudicating over competence disputes between the 
Westminster parliament and devolved bodies.
65
 
The jurisdiction inherited by the UKSC from the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords permitted two specific areas of review on constitutional grounds.  In 
the context of EU law, Parliament’s competence is substantively limited in two ways: 
first, it may not legislate contrary to EU law (s.2(4) EAC 1972); and second, courts 
enjoy power to ‘disapply’ national law to the extent that it is inconsistent with directly 
effective provisions of EU law.
66
  It is acting in this capacity – and in exercising the 
                                                                                                                                            
Robert E. Goodin, (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
64
 Northern Ireland Act 1998; Scotland Act 1998; Government of Wales Acts 1998 and 2006.  
65
 For instance: Martin and Miller v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 10. 
66
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power to disapply primary legislation – that the UKSC most clearly discharges 
functions akin to ‘strong form’ judicial review.67   
HRA review gives rise to consequences of a slightly different order, 
permitting courts to interpret primary legislation in order to achieve compliance with 
‘the Convention Rights’ so far as it is possible to do so or in the alternative providing 
for the issue of a declaration of incompatibility. Though neither option permits the 
court to mount a direct challenge to the legality of an Act of Parliament, the HRA 
nonetheless empowers the UKSC to act as a ‘counter-majoritarian’68 institution, an 
agent of ‘external standards of justice’, and arguably also (in prompting legislative 
reform via a declaration of incompatibility) as an ‘agent of constitutional change.’69  
To this developing constitutional jurisdiction can now be added the powers of 
the UKSC to determine legal disputes relating to ‘devolution issues’ that arise out of 
the transfer of legal powers to elected legislative bodies in Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales.
70
  The power of the Supreme Court – previously exercised by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council – is something of a departure from the traditional 
distinction placed by the constitution on the review of executive and legislative action, 
in the devolved context potentially subjecting both to judicial review.  In this context, 
the UKSC’s jurisdiction is once more counter-majoritarian and with a clear quasi-
federal dynamic which, although nascent since legal challenges to the legislative 
competence of the devolved legislatures have not been a common occurrence,
71
 
nonetheless provides evidence of the expanding powers of the court to intervene, on 
constitutional grounds, in decisions originating in the political sphere.  
 
                                                 
67
 See: M. Tushnet, ‘New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-
Based Worries’ (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 813.   
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 See: RB (Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10, at [209]-[211] 
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Implicit Powers of Quasi-Constitutional Review 
The basis for the implied constitutional jurisdiction of the House of Lords, and now 
UKSC, can be found in the regulatory role of the rule of law as well as in the parallel 
rejection of the suggestion that governmental powers might be substantially immune 
from judicial review.
72
 The continued expansion of judicial review and erosion of 
non-justiciability doctrines, which challenge Dicey’s monolithic reading of 
sovereignty, provides the clearest evidence of the incremental changes to the courts’ 
role within the constitution. On the one hand, the courts have acknowledged that 
external factors might influence statutory construction; a judicial belief in the 
‘sanctity’73 of statutory language has yielded ground to more generous and purposive 
techniques of construction (particularly in the constitutional sphere).
74
  On the other, 
the development of ideas associated with what has been referred to as ‘the common 
law constitution’ 75  have exposed the traditional positivist and sovereignty-driven 
explanation of the constitution as being inadequate.    
The constitutional aspirations of the common law (and of at least some of the 
judges) have been revealed through the incremental development of a body of 
‘constitutional rights’,76 and acknowledged in the distinction between constitutional 
and non-constitutional statutes.
77
 The high watermark of this line of reasoning 
remains Lord Hoffmann’s articulation of the principle of legality in R v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms.
 78
  Via the controlling mechanism of 
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74
 Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32, at [11] (Lord Bingham).   
75
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the common law, Hoffmann addresses one of the most controversial and divisive 
issues in contemporary public law discourse; the tension between the legal controls 
imposed by the rule of law and the theoretically limitless legal powers wielded by 
Parliament.  On the one hand, Hoffmann is at pains to preserve the ability of 
Parliament to legislate contrary to fundamental individual rights.  On the other, the 
constitutional function of the common law has very clearly expanded so as to subject 
primary legislation to a degree of legal control. 
 To say, however, that the principle of legality permits courts to ‘apply 
principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where 
the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document’79 is to 
overstate the point.  Clear legislative intent remains an unquestionable trump.  The 
most the common law empowerment allows the judges to do is to require express or 
unambiguous words where Parliament wishes to override fundamental rights or the 
rule of law.
80
 So on what basis can the UKSC interpret constitutional laws in future 
cases in a manner that respects the sovereignty of the legislature and the rule of law?  
 
A FINAL INTERPRETATIVE AUTHORITY 
Kate Malleson’s analysis of the evolving role of the UKSC concludes that ‘any 
assessment of its future role is inevitably speculative’.81 Knight concedes that any 
attempt to list the circumstances in which the court might ‘strike down legislation’ is 
‘an impossible task’.82 Similarly, Lord Phillips hopes that the power struggle between 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law ‘will remain academic’.83 Instead of 
avoiding the issue, we outline the foundation that underpins the court’s role before 
seeking to map out legitimate judicial responses for certain types of future 
constitutional cases.  Three sources of judicial review are available to determine the 
nature of the court’s response to questions of legislative and constitutional 
                                                 
79
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interpretation: Parliamentary intent, the common law constitution, and the rule of law.  
We argue that it is the rule of law that provides the foundation of, and normatively 
frames, the UKSC’s constitutional authority. The alternative sources (the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the common law) neither fully account for, nor explain, 
the constitutional influence of the UKSC for the reason that both structure the 
relationship between Parliament and the UKSC in hierarchical terms.  The argument 
that the UKSC derives its authority from the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty 
reduces the court’s constitutional supervision to determining the ‘will’ of Parliament: 
the result is the necessarily subordinate role discussed in the context of the judicial 
House of Lords. It fails to capture anything beyond the ‘plain meaning’ interpretation 
of statutes, is blind to new institutional conditions and environment, and is unable 
fully to conceptualise the functions and powers that the UKSC has acquired.   
The alternative thesis, by contrast, overextends the common law as the source 
of the UKSC’s authority. T.R.S Allan identifies two constitutional obligations for the 
courts. They have a primary, positive obligation to develop progressively the 
constitution,
84
 and a secondary obligation (to Parliament) ‘to apply the constitutional 
law of the United Kingdom, in accordance with the political morality on which that 
law is based’.85 The courts’ obedience to statute is subject to the normative substratum 
of the common law which consists of ‘independent principles of justice’, such as 
fairness, reason, accountability, but also fundamental rights and equality of treatment, 
‘that are appropriate for judicial application in all other areas of the common law’.86 
In other words, the courts do not merely police government action, but also the 
process of democracy itself (i.e. the formal validity of an Act). If the Act fails to 
commit ‘to some irreducible, minimum concept of the democratic principle’, its 
invidious nature would render it ‘unconstitutional’ and release the courts from their 
(habitual) obligation to apply it.
87
 Allan relegates Parliament in Lockean fashion from 
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‘sovereign’ to ‘supreme law-maker’, and promotes the courts to acquire ‘legal 
sovereignty’ for it is they who ultimately ‘determine the validity of statutes in 
accordance with the principle of equality and with due regard for the other essential 
constituents of the rule of law’.88  
Instead of rooting the court’s authority for judicial review in the common law, 
which for Allan rivals and replaces the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty as the 
rule of recognition, we would base it on the rule of law which for Dicey was ‘closely 
connected’ to, and thus mediated, Parliament’s legislative competence.89 Our premise 
has a number of advantages. A negative advantage is that it avoids the trappings of 
having to conceive the common law as a ‘higher order law’ 90 or as a ‘common law 
constitution’91 and, by extension, having to over-promote the UKSC by attributing to 
it full powers of constitutional review as the guardian of a supreme body of common 
law which it patently does not have. The UK constitution has not, to date, generated 
its own Marbury v. Madison moment, in which the apex court unilaterally claimed for 
itself the power to invalidate legislation which infringed the constitution.
92
 Nor, as a 
result of the pervasive influence of the sovereignty doctrine, has the separation of 
powers been so clearly defined as to permit United Kingdom courts to state that ‘[i]t 
is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law 
is’ with the same authority as the US Supreme Court in that decision.93     
Yet it is undoubtedly the role and function of the court to vindicate the rule of 
law.
94
  We argue that the UKSC’s authority proceeds from, and is framed by, the rule 
of law. This premise ‘lends additional normative weight and legitimacy to the 
judiciary, and explains why exactly judges should enjoy a privileged status’.95 It is 
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true that the rule of law is subject to divergent, formal and substantive, 
interpretation,
96
 but there is general agreement that it is an ideal for both Parliament 
and the courts. That he rule of law is one of the twin fundamentals on which the 
constitution rests,
97
 is acknowledged by scholars,
98
 judges
99
 and primary 
legislation.
100
 Whereas Parliament is the ‘grand forum of the nation’ that determines 
the national interest and enacts laws that should be prospective, stable, clear and 
general, the court is ‘the forum of principle’101 and of individual rights.  
For present purposes, the principles that the rule of law embraces are two-fold. 
On the one hand, they include factors that are designed to uphold individual rights 
retrospectively through their independence, accessibility, and the principles of natural 
justice.  A counter-majoritarian function is, therefore, integral to and inherent in the 
residual power of the courts to uphold the rule of law: ultimately, ‘the rule of law is 
nothing if it fails to constrain overweening power.’102  In short, the rule of law is ‘the 
ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based’,103 and may well be 
necessary for democracy itself.
104
  
On the other hand, the rule of law is designed to enhance two judicial virtues: 
courage and integrity.
105
 Courage allows the judge ‘to withstand pressures and 
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influences, even threats and exercise true independence in her decision-making’, 
whilst integrity demands ‘a commitment to the highest principles of judicial decision-
making’. 106  The judges’ ‘privileged status’ is necessary for them to work 
unencumbered from political and populist pressures,
107
 budgetary constraints, or the 
concerns of the press, and to decide individual and fundamental rights questions in 
accordance with constitutional principle.  In the United Kingdom, the rule of law lies 
behind the constitutional importance of independent justice, and is directly 
responsible for the visible separation of the UKSC from the structures of central 
government.   
Daniel Smilov traces judicial authority to four normative foundations (the 
separation of power, the rule of law, the judiciary’s ultimate authority to decide legal 
disputes, and their independence and impartiality
108
). But these four aspects actually 
make up our broader understanding of the rule of law: it is more than a procedural, 
functional device in administrative law and less than a substantive, normative source 
in common law constitutionalism. The expanded constitutional function of the UKSC 
runs in train with (and in some instances has precipitated) an understanding of the rule 
of law which demands justification for interferences with individual freedoms and 
which has steadily come to reject the construct of courts as mere agents of 
parliamentary intent.  Even if this reading of the rule of law remains open to debate, it 
must be conceded that a more formalist interpretation acknowledges that judges enjoy 
power to settle legal disputes and to state the law authoritatively so as to establish 
precedents.
109
 It is the acceptance of the determinative power of judicial decisions that 
underpins the positive contribution of the UKSC to the resolution of constitutional 
disputes.
110
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The authoritative interpretative function of the court is further supported by 
the fact that the occasions on which legislative action has been taken to reverse or 
otherwise avoid a judicial determination of the law have been rare.
 111
 The legally-
binding nature of judicial decisions is a requirement of legal certainty imposed by the 
rule of law, and therefore by the constitution.  To coin a phrase: Parliament habitually 
recognises judicial decisions as binding law. Indeed, the interpretative powers of the 
courts are so well-established that they are regarded as ‘politically entrenched’ by the 
elected branches, meaning that it is ‘not only politically difficult but also 
constitutionally questionable for parliaments to reject a court’s particular 
interpretations or even question a court’s interpretative methods.’112  As Laws L.J. has 
observed:  
 
The interpreter must be impartial, independent both of the legislature and of 
the persons affected by the text’s application, and authoritative – accepted as 
the last word, subject only to any appeal.  Only a court can fulfil that role.
113
 
 
Current practice is best illustrated with the operation of the HRA: to date there have 
been no legislative reversals of action taken pursuant to s.3(1), while declarations of 
incompatibility – the measure supposed to preserve the legislative discretion of 
Parliament
114
 – have been acted upon positively in all but one (particularly 
controversial) instance.
 115
  As a result, in each instance the declaratory function of the 
courts has been endorsed either tacitly or explicitly in subsequent remedial legislation.  
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The role of the apex court in the determination of the obligations imposed upon both 
executive and Parliament is not to be found in the making of non-binding 
contributions to a broader dialogue between branches,
116
 but often as the effective 
final domestic arbiter of the requirements of the HRA. Moreover, the suggestion that 
the legislative reversal or amendment of a judicial determination of the requirements 
of the law necessarily demonstrates parliamentary superiority ignores the fact that 
Parliament might well legislate for reasons other than asserting its constitutional 
superiority.  Primary legislation might clarify a particularly difficult or unclear area of 
the law, or provide certainty in the aftermath of a split decision of the apex court.
117
   
 
LEGITIMATE JUDICIAL RESPONSES IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
But how would the court respond, for instance, if Parliament passed legislation that 
disenfranchised a substantial proportion of the population on arbitrary grounds
118
 or 
insulated vast tranches of governmental activity from the scrutiny of the courts
119
 – in 
other words, failed to commit ‘to some irreducible, minimum concept of the 
democratic principle’ (Allan’s example noted above)? Possible judicial responses to 
Parliament doing the ‘unthinkable’120 – as Malleson has acknowledged – tend to be 
couched in ‘non-specific and slightly euphemistic terms’121and are countered with a 
straightforward re-assertion of the sovereignty of Parliament.
122
 None of these 
statements are practically helpful or normatively insightful.  
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Our argument is that the UKSC should be accommodated within the 
constitution as a locus of power, that is on a par with, but not superior to, the other 
political institutions, in order to determine disputes at the intersection of law and 
politics using its own inherent residual powers that are not anti-democratic but 
counter-majoritarian. It is, after all, within Parliament’s own reserve power to amend 
the law itself (a power which for Bickel ‘is of the essence, and no less so because it is 
often merely held in reserve’123).  In this heterarchical institutional conversation, the 
possibility of Parliament amending a judicial decision might condition the particular 
judicial remedy proposed, but so too may the possibility of an adverse judicial 
response condition Parliamentary law-making.
124
 Our constructive proposal is that the 
UKSC be recognised as: 
 
1. A constitutional organ 
i) it exercises proto-constitutional powers in relation to the European 
Union and the European Convention of Human Rights; 
ii) it acts as a quasi-federal court in devolution cases; 
2. A judicial organ 
iii) an ordinary court of law that habitually recognises Parliament’s 
legislative monopoly; 
iv) a supervisory court in non-constitutional (administrative) judicial 
review cases; 
3. A legitimating organ 
v) a liminal or threshold court in certain constitutional cases. 
 
We have already discussed the first two functions of the UKSC and concluded 
that those functions are now established and non-controversial. It is in its role as a 
legitimating organ that the status of the UKSC will likely be assessed in future cases. 
Where the UKSC acts as a liminal or threshold court with residual power in certain 
constitutional cases – to return to Allan’s example – the judges should neither 
straightforwardly interpret (and apply) the plain will of Parliament nor invalidate the 
                                                 
123
 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, p.17. 
124
 See, for instance, the saga relating to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Bill 
2004.  On which see: R. Rawlings, ‘Review, revenge and retreat’ (2005) 68 M.L.R. 378, 379.   
  
25 
 
Act based on ‘higher’ principles.  The UKSC is unlikely to follow uncritically and 
slavishly the central tenet of Diceyan orthodoxy: the ‘respect to be shown to the 
considered judgment of a democratic assembly’ is no longer a matter of assumption 
and ‘will vary according to the subject matter and the circumstances.’125 Conversely, 
the argument that the UKSC should extend its brief and strike down legislation would 
be a clear usurpation of the powers of the legislature.  We argue that there are three 
legitimate judicial responses in constitutional cases, each occupying a position 
between uncritical, literal application of parliamentary intent and robust judicial 
enforcement of a substantive rule of law.   
The most robust course available to the court draws inspiration from the 
seminal House of Lords decision in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation 
Commission.
126
  In the exceptional case of a clash between constitutional 
fundamentals, the Anisminic decision might be deployed in order to support the 
reinstatement of a jurisdiction apparently ousted by statute, or – read more broadly – 
prevent the attempted insulation by statute of otherwise ultra vires activity from 
judicial review.  While falling short of US-style constitutional review, ‘knowing’127 or 
‘disingenuous’128 judicial disobedience to primary legislation remains the most potent 
weapon available to the UKSC in the event of such a constitutional clash.  
Sitting below outright disobedience, in legal terms at least, would be the 
judicial articulation of a ‘declaration of unconstitutionality.’  Drawing inspiration 
from declarations of incompatibility under the HRA 1998, David Jenkins has argued 
that the courts possess the inherent power to declare Acts of Parliament to be 
unconstitutional ‘when Parliament legislates against legal norms or fundamental 
baselines for political behaviour deemed by courts of special significance within 
Britain’s unwritten constitution.’ 129  Such declarations, Jenkins argues, would 
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respectful of sovereignty in two ways.  First, they would be ‘nonbinding and not 
affect the legal validity’ of the statute in respect of which they were made.130  Second, 
‘the declaration openly recognizes Parliament’s exercise of sovereign power within 
(or, one might say, against) an accepted constitutional context.’ 131  Judicial 
disobedience would pose the most obvious threat to Parliament’s authority by 
rendering subsequent applications of the legislation contingent on the court’s 
disobedient response (though legislative restoration, or refinement, of the disputed 
provision would remain a possibility). The consequences of the issue of a ‘declaration 
of unconstitutionality’ would not be so severe.  A legislative response to such a 
declaration might result from the political damage caused by the interpretative 
authority attached to the judicial reading of the requirements of the constitution, but 
would not be an inevitability.  The impugned statute would remain operable.  The 
declaration of unconstitutionality would, therefore, better straddle the principle of 
judicial control and the principle of legislative supremacy, and offer greater respect to 
the political underpinnings of the UK constitution.  
Finally, the courts may in certain constitutional cases need to soften the letter 
of the law in order to achieve fairness in individual cases. Like equity, which 
‘mitigates the rigour of the common law’,132 the rule of law ensures that the formal 
legal doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty does not lose sight of constitutional 
principles (e.g. legality and equality) that are of fundamental importance in individual 
circumstances. According to Lord Hoffmann, the ‘principle of legality’ can be 
overridden by the clear direction of statutory language, which protects the sovereignty 
of Parliament yet arguably undercuts the notion of the United Kingdom as a 
‘European liberal democracy’ that recognises societal pluralism and protects the rights 
of minorities.
133
  
In conclusion, we argue that the rule of law requires courts to interpret an Act 
of Parliament and also to ensure that its application does not result in unfairness in 
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speciﬁc cases. Limits to majoritarianism are set through adjudication that is principled, 
reasoned, and public.
134
 Attempts to reconcile parliamentary intent with the 
requirements of the rule of law are a less dramatic and a more realistic and workable 
suggestion than the conferral of a general discretion on the courts to disapply 
unconstitutional and pernicious Acts of Parliament.
135
 Our proposal that sovereignty 
and the rule of law be acknowledged as constitutional equals reflects the new 
institutional balance that is not defined by the hierarchical ordering of the legislature 
and the judiciary, and a new constitutional choice that is not limited to the 
subordination or supremacy of the courts.
136
 
To classify this new conception as ‘judicial supremacism’ or ‘extra-judicial 
romanticism’ 137  would be too easy.  The mature constitution of a stable liberal 
Western democracy must have the ability to subject the legislative function to a 
degree of judicial control in the case of a conflict between a statute and a fundamental 
constitutional principle.  To classify the quasi-constitutional functions of the UKSC as 
a step towards judicial supremacism is to deny the distinctive functions of the 
legislative and judicial branches: ‘[c]ourts do not substitute Parliament in the making 
of policy decisions as they are limited by the principle of institutional integrity: 
“[t]here is a Rubicon which they may not cross.”’ 138  It also denies the crucial 
constitutional role of the courts in their habitual recognition of Parliament as 
sovereign.
139
 The constitutional functions and authority of the UKSC, therefore, form 
the embodiment of the balanced constitution in its modern incarnation.  The role of 
the UKSC is complementary to that of Parliament, and of the executive. To portray it 
otherwise is to deny the equality of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, and 
to make the rudimentary mistake of viewing courts as either supreme or subservient.   
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CONCLUSION 
At first blush, the UKSC represents the least radical option. It is neither a US-style 
Supreme Court nor a dedicated European-style constitutional court separate from the 
judicial system.
140
 Although no longer ‘hidden beneath the robes of [the] legislative 
assembly,’141 the UKSC assumes the jurisdiction of the judicial House of Lords, but 
with the addition of appeals arising under the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish 
devolution legislation of 1998. It exercises the same powers, and has no new power to 
annul or strike down legislation. Its procedures, although modernised, will much more 
closely resemble those of its predecessor than those of, say, the top courts of other 
European countries. In sum, the creation of the UKSC is not a radical departure from 
the mixed constitution with interlocking institutions.  
The argument advanced here has suggested that this narrative of continuity 
and stability understates the increased constitutional status and the continuing political 
repercussions of the UKSC.  In terms of constitutional theory, it represents greater 
adherence to the visible separation of powers and the requirements of judicial 
independence.
142
 More importantly, however, the creation of a formal apex court is 
also a milestone in the formalisation of the judicial branch and its functions and a 
manifestation of the ongoing shift in the balance of power, away from politicians 
towards the judges, which has implications for all constitutional institutions.  The 
creation of the UKSC finally vindicates aspects of the French and American 
constitutional paradigm. However, instead of forming part of a revolutionary 
constitutional moment or explicit break with the past, the UKSC ushers in a more 
visible separation of powers by stealth.   
There are those who see danger in the increased formalisation and autonomy 
of the judicial branch; Lord Neuberger, Master of the Rolls, has cautioned against the 
possibility of ‘judges arrogating to themselves greater power than they have at the 
moment’.143  Judicial review is still limited by Parliamentary sovereignty.  However, 
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this limitation has been significantly reduced by membership of the European Union, 
the increased effect of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the 
determination of some judges to protect fundamental constitutional rights. This trend 
may continue, should the courts claim an inherent power to strike down legislation or, 
at least, to render ineffective any Act of Parliament viewed as ‘unconstitutional.’144 
Such an outcome is, however, by no means certain.  The democratic underpinnings of 
statute law clearly resonate within the higher judiciary.
145
  As a result, the more 
accurate constitutional position is somewhere between the two extremes, with the 
UKSC operating at a variable, and context-specific, point between subordination and 
supremacy.   
Writing shortly before the announcement that the House of Lords would be 
replaced by a new Supreme Court, Robert Stevens asked whether the constitution 
should recognise ‘a “real” separation of powers and more meaningful concept of 
judicial independence’.146  The narrative so far of the UKSC provides an account that 
is partial, indirect, incomplete, and fails to address the newly-gained status and 
authority of the court. The essence of modern constitutionalism is not determined by 
its form (e.g. visible separation of powers, documentary constitution, higher-order law 
etc.) but through its content. The ‘new constitutional settlement’ that consists of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the devolution legislation of 1998, and the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 is best understood as allowing for a new constitutional relationship 
between Parliament and the courts in which each is able to make a distinctive 
contribution to the furtherance of rights protection and to the articulation of 
constitutional norms.
147
  The search for an ultimate constitutional authority is a 
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diversion: ‘legislative and judicial functions are complementary; the supremacism of 
either has no place.’148  
In this new constitutional order, democratic decision-making cannot simply 
mean securing the approval in legislatures of temporary political majorities. The 
courts share in the task of policing the boundaries of a rights-based democracy with 
the legislature and executive.
149
 By skirting the extremes of constitutional 
subordination and superiority the UKSC plays a meaningful constitutional role as a 
counter-majoritarian institution authorised by the principle of the rule of law to review 
private and public law cases, governmental conduct, and determine fundamental 
constitutional questions. In doing so it complements, and occasionally challenges 
(within reason and on grounds of principle), the traditional dualism between the 
legislature and the executive.  Empowered by the rule of law (the new ‘secret virtue’ 
of the UK constitution) the UKSC functions as a counter-majoritarian check within a 
reconfigured Westminster model of mixed government that recognises the valid 
contributions of all three organs of state power. 
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